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UID:20260617T054459EDT-1642t66U2O@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20260617T094459Z
DESCRIPTION:Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar\n\nSpeaker: Benteng Zou 
 – University of Luxembourg\, Luxembourg \n\n\n\nAbstract: We propose an al
 ternative dynamic theory of coalition breakdown. Motivated by recent coali
 tion splitting events\, we assume that: i) the payoff sharing rule within 
 coalitions is not necessarily set according to any optimality and/or stabi
 lity criterion\, and\, ii) players initially behave as if the coalition wi
 ll last for ever. If the sharing rule is non-negotiable or if renegotiatio
 n is very costly\, compliance to these rules may become unbearable for a g
 iven member as time passes because the rule\, being too rigid\, would make
  exit preferable. We examine this endogenous exit problem in the case of t
 ime-invariant sharing rules. Assuming a Nash non-cooperative game after (p
 otential) splitting where players play Markovian\, we characterize the sol
 utions of the endogenous exit problem in a linear-quadratic frame with end
 ogenous splitting time. We find that splitting countries are precisely tho
 se which use to benefit the most from the coalition. When initial pollutio
 n is high\, all shares should be low enough and none of the players should
  detain a payoff share larger than 1/2. If initial pollution is small\, we
  provide with an explicit interval for the sharing rule values preventing 
 the collapse of the coalition.\n\n(with Raouf Boucekkine\, Carmen Camacho\
 , Weihua Ruan)\n
DTSTART:20230330T150000Z
DTEND:20230330T160000Z
LOCATION:CA\, ZOOM
SUMMARY:How Do Coalitions Break Down? An Alternative View
URL:/cim/channels/event/how-do-coalitions-break-down-a
 lternative-view-351759
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