Fedor Sandomirskiy (Princeton University), Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness
"Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness"
听
(Princeton University)
Friday, April 24, 2026
10:00-11:30 PM听
Leacock 429
Host:听Larry Epstein
Field:听Miroeconomic Theory
Abstract:
We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are modeled via coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) when the intermediary cannot punish deviators, and via the set of individually rational correlated profiles (IRCP) when it can. We characterize games in which the IRCP or the CCE is unique, uncovering a structural link between these solution concepts. Our analysis also provides new conditions for the uniqueness of classical correlated and Nash equilibria that do not rely on the existence of dominant strategies. The resulting equilibria are robust to agents鈥� information about the environment, payoff perturbations, pre-play communication, equilibrium selection, and learning dynamics. We apply these results to collusion-proof mechanism design.